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On the Violence of Systemic Violence: A Critique of Slavoj Žižek  
 
Harry van der Linden 
 
  
Abstract 
 
This paper questions the extension of the common notion of violence, i.e., “subjective violence,” involving 
the intentional use of force to inflict injury or damage, towards social injustice as “systemic violence.” 
Systemic violence is altogether unlike subjective violence and the work of Slavoj Žižek illustrates that 
conceptual obfuscation in this regard may lead to an overly broad and facile justification of revolutionary 
violence as counter-violence to systemic violence, appealing to the ethics of self-defense. I argue that 
revolutionary violence is only justified to counter subjective violence inflicted or organized by the state. 
Thus I reject in conclusion Žižek’s further defense of revolutionary violence as retributive and as “shock 
therapy” necessary to disrupt the old society.    
 
I 
 
The common (“dictionary”) definition of violence is that it is the intentional use of physical 
force to inflict injury on human beings or damage to property.  My concern here is with violence 
towards human beings, especially for political purposes.  Presumably, we should include 
psychological violence within the common definition of violence, provided that it is narrowly 
understood as involving cases of extreme psychological pressure, intense humiliation, and 
intimidation, constituting, as it were, an assault on the mind analogous to a physical blow to the 
body. For example, some forms of torture as inflicted by Americans on Iraqi detainees in Abu 
Ghraib prison may be properly described as psychological violence. The common meaning of 
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violence may be called its “core” meaning in that broader conceptions of violence are typically 
based on extending this meaning.1 Johan Galtung’s classic and original statement in favor of an 
extended understanding of violence as structural (i.e., systemic) violence illustrates this point. 
He argues that the limited (core) notion of violence – which he calls “personal violence” – is 
unsatisfactory because it would make peace as the absence of violence a too restricted or 
“negative” ideal. Galtung writes: “Highly unacceptable social orders would still be compatible 
with peace. Hence, an extended concept of violence is indispensable but that concept should be a 
logical extension, not merely a list of undesirables.”2 He goes on to argue for a notion of 
structural violence as social injustice correlated to the broader ideal of “positive” peace as the 
absence of structural violence, that is, social justice. Progressives, or the Left, have widely 
accepted Galtung’s contention that we need a broader definition of violence, as is reflected in 
the topic of the Ninth Biennial RPA conference where this article was presented – “Violence: 
systemic, symbolic, and foundational.”   
My main aim here is to question the common extension of the core concept of violence 
towards structural or systemic violence.  I will do so on basis of Slavoj Žižek’s work (with an 
occasional reference to Galtung’s classic discussion of structural violence), especially his recent 
Violence (2008), because his work exemplifies what I see as the main practical problem of the 
notion of violence as systemic violence: appealing to the widely accepted idea that violence is 
permitted in self-defense, it lends itself to a too-easy and rather broad justification of 
revolutionary violence as counter-violence to systemic violence. I will argue that revolutionary 
violence is only justified to counter (physical) violence inflicted or supported by the state. From 
this perspective, I will argue in conclusion that we should also reject Žižek’s defense of 
revolutionary violence as retributive and as necessary to disrupt the entrenched social 
structures of the old society and transform pre-revolutionary desires and thought. 
                                                         
II 
 
                                               
1
  Cf. C.A.J. Coady, Morality and Political Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 23. 
2
 Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research VI/3 (1969): 167-
191, 168.  
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Žižek opens Violence by noting that when we think about violence we tend to think about 
criminal acts, acts of terror, civil unrest, and war. On his account, if we wish to understand 
violence, we must step back from the “fascinating lure” of this type of “subjective violence,” 
that is, “violence performed by a clearly identifiable agent,” and we must look at the violence in 
the background that generates subjective violence. Žižek continues: “This is the starting point, 
perhaps even the axiom, of the present book: subjective violence is just the most visible portion 
of a triumvirate that also includes two objective kinds of violence.”3  The first kind of objective 
violence is “symbolic violence,” referring to the “violence embodied in language and its 
forms.”4 The second type is “systemic violence,” referring to “the often catastrophic 
consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic and political systems.”5  Žižek adds 
that systemic violence tends be invisible because it is the “normal” state of affairs, the 
background against which we perceive subjective violence as disturbing. Yet, “it may be 
invisible, but it has to be taken into account if one is to make sense of what otherwise seem to be 
‘irrational’ explosions of subjective violence.”6  
In order to further explain what he means by systemic and subjective violence and how 
they are correlated, Žižek tells in Violence a story, taking place in 1922, of the Soviet government 
forcing into exile a large group of anti-communist intellectuals. They left for Germany on what 
became known as the “Philosophy Steamer.” Among them was the philosopher Nikolai Lossky, 
who “had enjoyed with his family a comfortable life of the haute bourgeoisie, supported by 
servants and nannies.”  Lesley Chamberlain, in her recent book on the expulsion of the 
intellectuals, reports that Lossky was puzzled as to why the Bolsheviks wanted to destroy his 
“gentle” way of life aimed at filling the world with high culture.7  Žižek comments: 
                                               
3
 Slavoj Žižek, Violence (New York: Picador, 2008), 1. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Ibid., 2. 
6
 Ibid. Galtung makes a similar observation about structural violence (at least, in static societies): 
“Structural violence is silent, it does not show – it is essentially static, it is the tranquil waters.” See his 
“Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” 173.  Even though Žižek does not cite Galtung, it is clear that his 
understanding of systemic violence is directly or indirectly influenced by Galtung. 
7
 Lesley Chamberlain, The Philosophy Steamer: Lenin and the Exile of the Intelligentsia (London: 
Atlantic Books, 2006). Published in the U.S. as Lenin’s Private War: The Voyage of the Philosophy 
Steamer: Lenin and the Exile of the Intelligentsia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008).  
4 
 
While Lossky was without doubt a sincere and benevolent person, really caring for the 
poor and trying to civilize Russian life, such an attitude betrays a breathtaking 
insensitivity to the systemic violence that had to go on in order for such a comfortable life 
to be possible. We’re talking here of the violence inherent in a system: not only direct 
physical violence, but also the more subtle forms of coercion that sustain relations of 
domination and exploitation, including the threat of violence.8  
Žižek continues to argue that since the Lossky family was blind to systemic violence, they could 
not understand threats of violence directed against them around the time of the Bolshevik 
revolution. For example, Lossky’s son was taunted by a working class schoolmate with the 
shouted words, “the days of him and his family are over now.”9 To the Losskys, this act was 
incomprehensible, an evil coming out of nowhere. Žižek adds: “What they didn’t understand 
was that in the guise of this irrational subjective violence, they were getting back the message 
they themselves sent out in its inverted true form.”10 In an endnote, Žižek writes that the 
Bolshevik expulsion of the intellectuals was justified,11 and, so, it is not altogether surprising 
that he concludes his discussion of the threat of violence against Lossky’s son as follows:  “It is 
this violence which seems to arise ‘out of nowhere’ that, perhaps, fits what Walter Benjamin … 
called pure, divine violence.”12  
I will return in section IV to Žižek’s notion of divine violence.  Now it should be noted 
that Žižek’s concept of subjective violence is similar to what I called the core notion of violence 
and that his extension of this core notion towards systemic violence has several components 
                                               
8
 Žižek, Violence, 9. 
9
 Žižek recalls the story inaccurately. Chamberlain writes in Lenin’s Private War that it was a servant girl 
who retorted to the son: “Pushkin-Lyagushkins! They will go to the devil now, you see” (24).  My later 
comments on the Lossky are not meant as comments on the actual Losskys but rather as comments on the 
Losskys as constructed by Žižek.  I think that Žižek overstates Nikolai Lossky’s social blindness and 
political naivety.   
10
 Žižek, Violence, 10.  
11
 Ibid., 219 (chapter 1, note 1). I would have some sympathy with Žižek’s position if it were the case that 
all exiles were active supporters of pre-revolutionary Russia and sought its restoration. However, many of 
the exiles, including Lossky himself, were critics of both the old regime and Bolshevism, and apparently 
Žižek holds that any intellectual opposition to Bolshevism was rightfully suppressed.  
12
 Ibid., 10.   
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that he fails to distinguish.13  First, Žižek uses the concept of systemic violence to indicate that 
certain social structures or institutional practices, such as political domination or capitalist 
exploitation, cause people to engage in subjective violence, both individually (e.g., rape and 
murder) and collectively (e.g., riots and war).   In other words, social arrangements that cause 
subjective violence performed by individuals are called “systemically violent.” Žižek uses 
“systemic violence” in this manner when he claims, as we have just noted, that “explosions of 
subjective violence” appear irrational if we don’t take into account systemic violence as their 
“invisible” background.  It is also the failure to grasp systemic violence in this sense that left the 
Losskys bewildered concerning the verbal attack against their son.  No doubt, Žižek is correct 
that much subjective violence has political and economic causes, but he fails to substantiate why 
we must speak of invisible systemic violence in order to make this point.  In my view, it is 
conceptually clearer to say that capitalist exploitation, for example, is a causal factor of violence 
than to claim that this exploitation is systemic violence. Still, as long as “systemic violence” is 
used merely in this way there does not seem to be any important practical issue (benefit or cost) 
at stake in extending the core notion of violence.   
Second, Žižek uses the notion of systemic violence to refer to the fact that unjust social 
structures or institutions are sustained by threats of violence. Thus one aspect of Žižek’s claim 
that Nikolai Lossky was blind to the systemic violence of pre-revolutionary Russia is that he 
was blind to the continuous threats of violence that were required to sustain this unjust society 
and his own lifestyle. Again, it seems conceptually preferable to say that threats of violence are 
inherent and common to certain social arrangements, or to speak of latent subjective violence 
manifest in certain social arrangements, than to call such arrangements “systemically violent.” 
And, once more, not much seems to hinge on this other than a preference for conceptual clarity.  
Third, Žižek uses the notion of systemic violence to refer to the fact that unjust 
institutional arrangements bring about serious harms, just as is true of subjective violence. Or, 
in the language of Galtung, whose view Žižek seems to accept, at least in its broad outlines, 
personal violence impedes our mental and physical functioning; social injustice, including 
                                               
13
 Coady draws the same distinctions in his discussion of Galtung’s notion of structural violence. See 
Coady, Morality and Political Violence, 26. 
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exploitation, economic inequality, oppression, exploitation, and the like, has the same impact; 
and, so, social injustice is structural violence.  Accordingly, a person robbed at gunpoint is a 
victim of personal violence, while a poor person with an underpaid job or desperately in search 
of a job in an affluent society is a victim of structural violence. Here the purpose of talking about 
systemic violence is to bring attention to the fact that structures or institutional practices 
wrongly inflict significant harm upon us even if no subjective violence is directed at us.14  Žižek 
seems to have this understanding in mind when he first introduces the notion of systemic 
violence as involving “the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our 
economic and political systems.” In other words, the smooth functioning of capitalism is, in fact, 
a violent process since it leaves behind a trail of preventable or unnecessary harms and 
suffering.  Žižek also seems to appeal to this understanding of systemic violence when he 
maintains that there is “systemic violence inherent in the social conditions of global capitalism 
[since they] involve the ‘automatic’ creation of excluded and dispensable individuals from the 
homeless to the unemployed.”15  
The third meaning of systemic violence is its main meaning, and from now on I am 
using “systemic violence” in this meaning unless noted otherwise. Conflation of this meaning 
with the other two leads to muddled arguments and may leave one’s proposed practical goals 
unclear. Relatedly, to view systemic violence and subjective violence as forms of violence may 
lead one to too quickly drawing the conclusion that the reduction of each requires the same 
remedies and strategies of change.16  The most serious practical problem of the adoption of the 
notion of systemic violence, however, is that it may lead to the indefensible view that violence 
that seeks to counter systemic violence as such is legitimate revolutionary violence. To clarify 
this point, we must ask when subjective violence is justified. The common-sense view, to which 
Žižek seems to appeal (and which I accept in its broad outline), is that violence might be 
appropriate in the case of self-defense, or in the defense of other people, against persons who 
intentionally engage in, or pose a credible and immediate threat of, wrongful violence and are 
                                               
14
 See ibid. 
15
 Žižek, Violence, 14.  Žižek approvingly describes here Etienne Balibar’s account of systemic 
violence.  
16
 Cf. Coady, Morality and Political Violence, 33-34. 
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not fully excused in having the intention to inflict harm due to such factors as extreme duress 
and mental illness. Justified counter-violence must be necessary violence, for when a threat can 
be met in a nonviolent way a violent response would be disproportionate and, therefore, wrong.  
In a word, those who to some degree are morally responsible for wrongful or non-defensive 
violence lose their immunity to being subjected to violence. We may meet violence then with 
counter-violence.  Roughly speaking, this ethics of self-defense is the same in meeting wrongful 
individual subjective violence (violent crime) and wrongful collective subjective violence (wars 
of aggression).17  
At first, it seems that Žižek holds that this justification of violence as counter-violence or 
reactive violence is not applicable to systemic violence.  He argues that in modern capitalism “it 
is the self-propelling metaphysical dance of capital that runs the show, that provides the key to 
real-life developments and catastrophes.”  Žižek continues: “Therein resides the fundamental 
systemic violence of capitalism, much more uncanny than any direct pre-capitalist socio-
ideological violence: this violence is no longer attributable to concrete individuals and their 
‘evil’ intentions, but is purely ‘objective,’ systemic, anonymous.”18 Accordingly, it would seem 
that since systemic violence is not attributable to specific individuals, the common justification 
of counter-violence is not relevant here since it concerns agents who have made themselves 
liable to counter-violence.  The same seems to be true of Galtung’s understanding of structural 
(systemic) violence because he argues that it should be conceived of as indirect violence since it 
lacks actors behind the violence similar to the subjects that execute personal violence.19  
                                               
17
 This is not to say that the practical rules governing both are the same. For example, war permits a more 
liberal use of lethal force since the perpetrators of unjust violence by putting on a uniform signal their 
preparedness to kill, whereas in violent individual (criminal) acts the intention of the agent is often 
unclear and falls short of lethal.  
18
 Žižek, Violence, 12-13. Žižek is approvingly stating here what he considers to be Karl Marx’s 
standpoint.  In my view, Marx’s self-understanding excludes ascriptions of responsibility, while in fact he 
frequently ascribes blame in the course of his actual study of capitalist society. Accordingly, Marx writes 
in the Preface to the First Edition of Capital, Volume I (New York: Vintage Books, 1977): “I do not by 
any means depict the capitalist and the landowner in rosy colors. But individuals are dealt with here only 
in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, the bearers of particular class-
relations…. My standpoint, from which the development of the economic formation of society is viewed 
as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for relations whose 
creature he remains…” (92). Žižek’s work suffers from the same inconsistency. 
19
 Galtung, “Violence, Peace and Peace Research,” 170-71.   
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However, it is obviously the case that unjust social structures are kept in place by individuals 
who fulfill, in varying degrees, indispensable roles in the continuation of the structures.  These 
individuals sustain or execute “systemic violence,” profit from it, and can be held in varying 
degrees morally responsible for it.  Thus it would appear that these individuals are appropriate 
targets for counter-violence.  Indeed, Žižek seems to draw this conclusion when he writes in 
reference to the violence directed at the Lossky family that “they were getting back the message 
they themselves sent out in its inverted true form.”  
Žižek is more explicit in making this inference in his analysis of “humanitarian” 
capitalists. He maintains that most people see only the philanthropic deeds of “humanitarian” 
capitalists, while the systemic violence that these capitalists inflict to generate the resources for 
their “good deeds” remains invisible. So people cherish, for example, the “good deeds” that 
King Leopold II bestowed on the Belgian people, including museums, parks, and public 
buildings, but they are blind to how his “ruthless exploitation” of natural resources in the 
Congo created a “holocaust” there.20 Andrew Carnegie, with his use of a private army to 
suppress his workers, offers another classical example of humanitarianism masking brutal 
exploitation.21 But Žižek’s strongest criticisms are reserved for today’s “liberal communists,” 
such as Bill Gates and George Soros, who favor capitalism (and so are “liberals”) and also 
pursue progressive goals, such as ending racism, poverty, and environmental destruction (and 
so are “communists”).22 What their admirers fail to see is that “today’s liberal communists give 
away with one hand what they first took with the other,” and that they “commit systemic 
violence that generates the very phenomena they abhor.”23  In conclusion, Žižek wonders how 
we should treat in the final analysis the “liberal communist who is undoubtedly a good man.” 24 
                                               
20
 Žižek, Violence, 14-15.  Žižek overstates his case since Leopold’s private rule of the Congo became a 
world-wide public scandal at the turn of the 19th century and led the Belgian state to take over its 
administration in 1908.  
21
 Ibid., 21. 
22
 Ibid., 19-23. See also Slavoj Žižek, “The Liberal Communists of Porto Davos,” In These Times, April 
11, 2006, posted at http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/2574/. Žižek writes that the French journalist 
Olivier Malnuit coined the phrase “liberal communists.”  
23See Žižek, Violence, 21 and 206, respectively. 
24
 Ibid., 38. 
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He offers Bertolt Brecht’s poem “The Interrogation of the Good” as his answer, the last lines of 
which read as follows:  
Hear us then: we know 
You are our enemy. This is why we shall 
Now put you in front of a wall. But in consideration of  
your merits and good qualities 
We shall put you in front of a good wall and shoot you 
With a good bullet from a good gun and bury you 
With a good shovel in the good earth.25  
Thus Žižek argues, in fact, that the perpetrators of systemic violence are appropriate targets of 
revolutionary violence, just as the perpetrators of wrongful subjective violence are liable to 
defensive violence. To be sure, Žižek’s exposition of the “humanitarian” capitalists conflates 
how individuals like Carnegie harmed their workers by ordering subjective violence against 
their struggles to improve their condition and how he harmed them through systemic violence 
by paying them poor wages and the like, but his main point that the “metaphysical dance of 
capitalism” actually has willing and culpable partners is clear. Many people are in various 
degrees responsible for upholding systemic violence, and so applying the common 
understanding of justified counter-violence as defensive violence, we end up with a very broad 
justification of revolutionary violence.   
To call the harms of the normal functioning of global capitalism the result of “systemic 
violence” has a certain appeal.  All too often such harms are overlooked, and putting them 
under the heading of systemic violence adds to their gravity and may make them more difficult 
to ignore.  Surely, it is, for example, disconcerting that cases of public shootings in the United 
States make the headlines and that violent crime is central to much broadcasting, while huge 
harms caused by immoral social and economic institutional practices, such as the global human 
cost of raised food prices partly as a result of commodity speculation on Wall Street, receive 
hardly any attention. Accordingly, it is understandable that those who seek to overcome social 
injustice designate it as “systemic violence,” and so seek to question the morality of those who 
                                               
25
 Ibid., 39. 
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set or uphold unjust institutional rules with an air of innocence. This emancipatory purpose of 
the concept of systemic violence is more convincing as a rationale for adopting the concept than 
claims to the effect that the concept is important in order to bring attention to the fact that social 
injustice is sustained by the use of physical force or may cause people to commit acts of 
subjective violence. It is also more convincing than Galtung’s rationale that we should define 
social injustice as an instance of violence so that the notion of peace as absence of violence is 
enriched. After all, we could simply proclaim that we must seek peace and justice (and peace 
studies could then still focus on social justice as a precondition for lasting peace).  However, the 
emancipatory purpose is gained at the cost of conceptual clarity. More importantly, I doubt that 
this purpose outweighs the danger that the notion of systemic violence may lead to a very 
broad and superficial legitimation of revolutionary violence. Certainly, this danger means that 
we should be much more cautious and qualified in our discourse about social injustice in terms 
of systemic violence.  But, of course, my claims assume what I still have to show: there are 
important differences between subjective violence and systemic violence, so that it would 
indeed be mistaken to hold that the justification of counter-violence with regard to subjective 
violence can transfer to, or includes, a justification of counter-violence against unjust social 
rules.                                                                                 
 
III 
 
In order to examine the differences between systemic violence and subjective violence, we must 
compare them in terms of the moral liability of their agents, their respective processes of 
violence, including the types of harms generated, and the action options available to their 
victims.  Let us first consider again the issue of moral liability. The prevailing view regarding 
the moral liability of the perpetrators of wrongful individual subjective violence is that they are 
generally fully morally responsible for the harm that they cause.  No doubt, full culpability for 
subjective violence is too easily assumed in our society, the social roots of violence are too often 
ignored, moral indignation is too quickly expressed, and punishment is too eagerly and harshly 
imposed.  Still, in most cases of subjective violence at least some moral responsibility may be 
11 
 
assumed and this is all that is required to (prima facie) justify counter-violence.  Reduced 
culpability, however, raises the bar on what counts as proportionate counter-violence.  As a 
general rule, the less the culpability of the perpetrators, the more the agents of counter-violence 
must be restrained in their use of force and so accept an increased risk of harm to themselves in 
order to reduce harm to the perpetrator. And how much harm they are willing to risk should 
increase as well.26 It follows that much counter-violence in our society is excessive, while much 
praise for the agents of legitimate counter-violence is too easily given, so that this praise often at 
best is a distortion of the moral and emotional complexity of the decision to use force, and at 
worst a factor in stimulating excessive or even unjustified counter-violence. But there is no need 
to further explore here in our comparative analysis of the two types of violence the issue of 
praise for exercising justified subjective violence because in the common understanding of 
systemic violence it is wrongful violence only (and so its agents are not subject to praise).27  
In sharp contrast to the culpability of the perpetrators of wrongful subjective violence, 
the culpability of the agents of systemic violence receives little attention in our society. 
Typically, this culpability is not recognized as an issue or it is viewed as non-existing or 
negligible.  To the extent that the harms of systemic violence are recognized, one seems 
apparently to accept the common self-understanding of the perpetrators of this violence that 
they have good intentions in upholding the rules of their institutions, that they are not doing 
anything to cause the harms, or that the harms are the fault of the victims themselves or simply 
inevitable.  At most, in the dominant view the very wealthy agents of systemic violence are 
mildly blamed for not contributing more to the relief of human suffering through charitable 
                                               
26
 For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), especially chapter 4. 
27
 Since systemic violence in the common understanding refers to avoidable and unnecessary harms, this 
violence is always immoral and its agents are never appropriate subjects for praise. It appears, then, that 
we have here a significant dissimilarity between subjective and systemic violence. Cf. Coady, Morality 
and Political Violence, 33.  However, this dissimilarity does not seem to bear on the issue of how the 
justification of counter-violence might be different with regard to wrongful subjective violence and 
systemic violence.  Moreover, if we would include in the definition of systemic violence harms that are 
presently necessary but avoidable in the future, then some systemic violence might be warranted and the 
agents who sustain it may even be rightly praised.  We may, for example, interpret Marx as claiming that 
systemic violence is inherent to socialist society in transition towards full communism. From this 
perspective, those who maintain this violence as a necessary step toward full communism might deserve 
praise. 
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work.  In response, it should be acknowledged that the agents of systemic violence indeed 
typically do not intend or want to inflict harm, while the same is usually not true of people 
engaged in wrongful subjective violence. We will soon see that this fact is significant in terms of 
how the victims of subjective and systemic violence experience their respective harms 
differently.  In terms of moral liability, however, the difference in intention is not essential.  
After all, we also hold that threats that are not intended but rather the result of negligence or 
recklessness may be met by violent self-defense or defense of others.  Say a person who 
recklessly speeds through a neighborhood with children may in principle be violently stopped 
to save a child’s life. So what makes people possible appropriate subjects for a violent response 
is not only intention alone but more broadly that we can meaningfully ascribe the wrongful 
harm caused by them to their agency. The agents of systemic violence may be appropriate 
subjects for a violent response because they are culpably wrong in their understanding that they 
are not “doing anything” in bringing on the harms of their society or that these harms are the 
victims’ fault or basically inevitable.  Nikolai Lossky erred in this way by failing to examine his 
own role in sustaining the oppressive institutions of pre-revolutionary Russia.  Generally, 
people can be held morally responsible for not critically examining their own beliefs when these 
beliefs conveniently allow them to live very comfortably amidst much suffering.  And the more 
people fulfill positions of authority the greater their culpability becomes, and so we may then 
hold them accountable in increasing degree for not changing their harmful institutions and 
hiding their failure in this regard behind “good deeds.”  Still, it must also be acknowledged that 
the connections between individual actors, their institutions, and the harms caused by these 
institutions are often complex and at times hard to gauge.   From this angle, it is remarkable that 
Žižek states with great confidence (as we have just seen) that “today’s liberal communists give 
away with one hand what they first took with the other,” while he also says in a recent 
interview that “I don’t think we really know how capitalism functions.”  Žižek continues: “The 
entire Marxist conceptual structure is based on the notion of exploitation. How does this 
concept function today? I don’t have an answer.”28  
                                               
28
 “Divine Violence and Liberated Territories: Soft Targets talks with Slavoj Žižek” (March 14, 2007), 3, 
in Soft Targets 2.1, posted at http://www.softtargetsjournal.com/web/zizek.php.  
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In short, the conclusion is that the degree of moral responsibility of the perpetrators of 
wrongful subjective violence and systemic violence do not so differ that it follows on this 
ground that the justification of counter-violence with regard to the former does not apply to the 
latter.  Excusing conditions will typically differ in the two cases – notably, social injustice versus 
lack of causal transparency – but this does not bear on the validity of the conclusion since in 
neither case do the excusing conditions tend to completely absolve moral responsibility.  
Perhaps moral responsibility varies more among the perpetrators of systemic violence than is 
true of the perpetrators of individual subjective violence, but once again this does not 
undermine the conclusion because what is pivotal is that some responsibility is prevalent 
among most of the perpetrators of both forms of violence. Moreover, great variations in 
individual liability also occur among the perpetrators of unjust wars as a form of collective 
subjective violence.  Soldiers who fight a defensive war against aggression will rightfully end 
up killing and wounding enemy soldiers whose responsibility might vary greatly due to 
differences in rank, duress, and support for the war. So, clearly, my contention that it is an error 
to justify revolutionary violence as counter-violence to systemic violence must be established on 
a ground other than that the moral liability of the perpetrators of wrongful subjective violence 
and systemic violence are decidedly dissimilar.     
The most striking differences between systemic violence and subjective violence are to 
be found in their respective processes of violence. The dissimilarities are so pronounced that 
were it not for the fact that subjective violence sustains social injustice and that social injustice is 
a cause of subjective violence it would be hard to transition mentally from the core meaning of 
violence to the notion that social injustice is violence. In other words, equivocation prevents that 
the notion of systemic violence is experienced as highly counterintuitive. At any rate, subjective 
violence is a process of physical force, or a “mental blow,” often suddenly and unexpectedly 
aimed at its victims, while systemic violence is a matter of being subject to harmful institutional 
rules as part of everyday-life functioning.  Subjective violence in its most basic form involves 
that its agents generate physical force through their own body (stabbing, hitting, etc.), or an 
immediate extension of their bodies (shooting), and this physical force then strikes the victim.  
In psychological violence, the “mental blow” against the victim is also usually directly 
14 
 
generated by the perpetrator (shouting, threatening, simulating killing, etc.).  The agents of 
systemic violence, to the contrary, do not generate or use “force,” but rather create or maintain 
institutional rules that unjustly restrict the opportunities of their victims. People tend to accept 
oppressive rules, but even under such conditions law enforcement may lead to considerable 
physical harm. The agents of systemic violence might directly order or support this subjective 
violence and so be morally responsible for it, but it should be noted again that as agents proper 
of systemic violence they only execute, and are responsible for, “invisible violence,” or the harm 
embedded in the mere conformance to oppressive rules.  
The self-understanding of the perpetrators of systemic violence is such that they do not 
experience their “invisible violence” as traumatic, and what sustains their mental comfort is that 
the link between them and their victims is highly institutionally mediated.  Directly inflicting 
subjective violence, to the contrary, is often felt as very traumatizing.  Consider soldiers fighting 
in what they view as a just war.  Assume, further, that they are actually engaged in wrongful 
subjective violence (so that the comparison with the perpetrators of systemic violence is closer).  
Like the perpetrators of daily systemic violence, the soldiers might (at least, initially) not wish 
to harm their victims (in the long run, hatred for the enemy might evolve), but unlike the 
perpetrators of systemic violence who restrict the opportunities of their victims, they are in fact 
attacking persons and wounding and killing them. In On Killing, David A. Grossman has made a 
strong case that most people have a deep resistance to performing the act of wounding and 
killing, and that this resistance is a major factor in explaining why soldiers who have killed end 
up deeply traumatized, including acquiring PSTD.29  Other factors contribute to the emergence 
of trauma, such as fear, exhaustion, and feeling guilty about the possible exhilaration 
experienced when a successful “kill” takes place, but this only underlines how different 
subjective and objective violence are in terms of their impact on their agents.  It is only in how 
psychological distance between the agents and recipients of violence is created that some 
resemblances emerge or that the dissimilarities become a bit less striking. Soldiers might find it 
easier to kill or wound the enemy by dehumanizing them, viewing them as morally inferior, 
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 See David A. Grossman, On Killing (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), especially Sections II 
and VII. 
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etc., processes not altogether unlike the perpetrators of systemic violence blaming their victims 
for their poverty, inadequate schooling, poor health, etc.  Furthermore, military technology has 
enabled that killing in war is increasingly long-distance killing (even though asymmetric or 
fourth generation warfare somewhat reverses the trend30), making it easier for soldiers to 
sidestep their responsibility for causing harm and so avoid psychological trauma. The victims 
become more or less invisible, and the fact that the “force” of violence is no longer generated by 
the soldiers’ bodies, or immediate extension thereof, enables them to become even more 
disengaged from what they are in fact doing.  In a word, the execution of subjective violence in 
modern war is becoming more impersonal and detached, even though hardly as comfortable as 
the execution of systemic violence.  
The “force” at the endpoint of the process of subjective violence, however, stays in place 
whether the violence is technologically mediated or not, and this force leads to a much more 
narrow range of harms inflicted by subjective violence than is caused by systemic violence.  The 
harms of subjective violence are death, bodily harms, and acute psychological malfunctioning 
caused by “force,” while social injustice or systemic violence leads to such a wide variety of 
harms as social and political exclusion, inadequate intellectual development due to insufficient 
educational opportunities, harsh working conditions, subsistent wages, lack of free time and 
recreational opportunities, inadequate housing or no housing at all, lack of basic medical care, 
hunger, and inadequate access to clean water.  We have noted that the degree of permitted 
counter-violence should vary with the seriousness of the violent threat and the culpability of the 
perpetrator, and that from this perspective much counter-violence in our society is 
disproportionate or excessive.  Some of the harms of systemic violence (e.g., restricted 
educational opportunities) are such that revolutionary violence as counter-violence would be 
disproportionate, especially since revolutionary violence may easily escalate and inevitably 
include seriously harming people with limited moral responsibility.  Other harms caused by 
poor institutions, though, such as serious illness, starvation, or a much-reduced lifespan, are 
such that they meet the bar set by proportionality.   
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 See Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 
2004).  
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What should be taken into account in making such proportionality judgments is that 
subjective violence tends to have a different psychological impact on its victims than systemic 
violence, even when their respective harms are otherwise equally bad or even similar in kind. 
Only subjective violence tends to come suddenly to its victims, often leaving them in fear, 
shock, paralysis, and helplessness.  What adds to their trauma is the very realization that 
another human being is intent on physically harming or killing them, disrupting the everyday 
trust in minimal human decency and cooperation. So, for example, even a preventable 
industrial accident that occurs due to infrequent safety inspections as an instance of systemic 
violence will have a different psychological impact on a mining community than a brutal attack 
by the mine owner’s private army against a peaceful protest of his workers in support of greater 
mine safety.  Much systemic violence can be integrated into everyday life, but the same is much 
more difficult to do with regard to most subjective violence.  It is this very fact that makes 
oppressive political violence so often effective in the short run.  But, again, the differences here 
between subjective and systemic violence are less pronounced when subjective violence 
becomes impersonally or “bureaucratically” executed, as, for example, in penal violence (what 
happens during an execution provides a good illustration) and strategic bombing (assuming 
that the bombing campaigns remain limited in scope and frequency).  
This brings me to the most crucial distinction – for my purpose here – between systemic 
and subjective violence: the range of options available to the victims in addressing the former 
are much greater than for the latter.  Once the clubs come down or the bullets fly in political 
protest, the choice is to flee and capitulate, fight back, or hope that nonviolent sacrifice will 
cease the violence.  Similarly, once a war of aggression is under way the basic choice is to fight 
back or surrender and then hope that a massacre will not follow.  Surrender does not preclude 
nonviolent resistance to the aggressor, but it means at least that the aggressor has been initially 
successful in imposing his political will.  In cases of political violence, the intention of the 
perpetrator is typically to impose his political will, restricting the options of the victims by 
making resistance to this will very costly. Personal violence might not have such coercive intent, 
but similar limited action options are in place. Basically, once an individual attacks you 
personally, the choice is to fight back or hope that the cheek is not hit too hard when it is 
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turned.  In my view, fighting back, or counter-violence, is a prima facie right, but to make its 
actual execution morally right presumes that other moral standards are satisfied, such as 
proportionality in the case of individual counter-violence and jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
standards (or approximations thereof) in the case of collective violence. The mere fact of 
systemic violence, to the contrary, does not warrant counter-violence; for social injustice can be 
effectively addressed in many different ways, including through institutional reforms from 
within, nonviolent protests, boycotts, collective strikes, lobbying, and electoral action.  Even 
when social injustice can only be addressed through revolutionary change, counter-violence is 
not prima-facie warranted because it might be disproportionate.  More importantly, it might not 
be necessary because it has become abundantly clear during the past few decades that 
nonviolence strategies can be remarkably successful in overthrowing oppressive regimes and 
the recent emergence of the global public sphere will only increase the chance of success of 
future endeavors.  However, once the struggle for social justice is met by widespread violence 
inflicted, or supported, by the state, revolutionary counter-violence is prima facie morally right.  
Broadly speaking, the ethics of self-defense retains its moral force in light of the fact that 
nonviolence has not proven to be effective against agents who have no qualms unleashing 
subjective violence.  No doubt, these are all difficult moral issues that should be carefully 
discussed and placed within their historical context.  But all too often this does not happen in 
Žižek’s work, especially in Violence, and what we find instead is the claim that systemic violence 
rightfully begets subjective violence because it projects violence.  This claim has only a ring of 
plausibility when we neglect that the two types of violence in this equation create very different 
ranges of options for remedial action.  A more critical use of the concept of violence would not 
enable him to offer such a broad and facile justification of revolutionary violence. 
To avoid misunderstanding, I am not claiming that the notion of systemic violence 
necessarily leads to a broad and superficial justification of revolutionary violence.  Galtung, for 
example, does not make such an inference. However, one must then ask why the inference is 
not appropriate since it is commonly accepted that counter-violence against wrongful violence 
is justified. This means that one must show how systemic violence differs from subjective 
violence so that counter-violence is generally only prima facie just with regard to the latter. I 
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suspect that once such differences are articulated (as I have tried to do in this paper) the notion 
of systemic violence loses much of its credibility. At any rate, the proponent of the notion of 
systemic violence should at least caution or clarify that our typical emotive and moral responses 
to subjective violence might not apply to systemic violence.  The proponent also should outline 
some convincing limits on extending the core concept of violence because without such limits, 
as will become clear in the next section, we might end up with more conceptual and practical 
confusion and questionable support of revolutionary violence.  
 
 
 
 
IV 
 
For Žižek, some revolutionary violence is divine violence, characterized as violence that 
seemingly comes out of nowhere and constitutes a rupture of the status quo; it is violence that is 
destructive of law rather than violence that confirms law; it is not the violence of an angry God 
against a sinning humanity in general (e.g., as some Christian fundamentalists viewed 
Hurricane Katrina), but rather it is the people’s violence (“in the precise sense of … vox populi, 
vox dei”).31 Even though Žižek also describes divine violence as “violent popular self-defense,”32 
he places most emphasis on the retributive component of this violence. Referring to Walter 
Benjamin’s angel of history who is propelled with his back into the future by a storm blowing 
from paradise and who witnesses the “pile of debris before him grow[ing] skyward,” Žižek 
maintains that divine violence may be seen as “the wild intervention of this angel,” who 
“strikes back to restore the balance [of justice], to enact a revenge for the destructive impact of 
‘progress.’”  He adds: “Somewhere, in the sphere of the ‘divine,’ perhaps these injustices are not 
forgotten. They are accumulated, the wrongs are registered, the tension grows more and more 
                                               
31See Žižek, Violence, 201 and 202.  
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 Slavoj Žižek, In Defense of Lost Causes (London: Verso, 2008), 478. He is referring here to the 
“necklacing” of informants, police assassins, etc. of the Jean-Claude Duvalier dictatorship by supporters 
of the new Jean-Bertrand Aristide regime.  
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unbearable, till divine violence explodes in a retaliatory destructive rage.”33  In short, divine 
violence is “Judgment Day for the long history of oppression, exploitation, suffering,” and it is 
violence following the motto “fiat iustitia, pereat mundus.”34  
Žižek’s examples of divine violence range strikingly in their historical scope and 
significance, including the threat against Lossky’s son, the regime of terror of the French 
Revolution, the “Red Terror of 1919,” looting and burning in the rich parts of Rio de Janeiro by 
the people of the favelas (“they were like biblical locusts, the divine punishment for men’s 
sinful ways”),35 “necklacing” done by supporters of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti,36 and the 
recent Maoist rebellion in India.37 Žižek’s defense of violence in these cases ranges from fairly 
detailed discussions in a few cases to simply noting that the violence was “divine” (i.e., serving 
retribution) in other instances and so apparently legitimate. It is not the place here to assess his 
historical interpretation and defense of various revolutions or discuss his take on various recent 
protests; instead it should be noted that the very notion of revolutionary violence as retribution 
should be rejected on moral grounds.   
From the perspective that violence is justified as counter-violence only, divine violence 
as retribution is indiscriminate since it is aimed at culpable persons irrespective of whether they 
pose a threat.  Only those who seek to uphold the old regime through the use of force are 
appropriate targets of revolutionary violence. But even when this limit is taken into account, 
revolution as retribution is subject to dangers similar to fighting war as retribution to 
aggression: excessive or disproportionate force might be used, the rules of surrender might be 
ignored, and prisoners may be poorly treated or summarily executed. In both war and 
revolution, punishment should take place by legal instruments after the end of the conflict, 
allowing for the establishment of individual guilt. Once these guidelines are set aside, the 
injustice might be carried over into the future, and so the justice of the post-war or post-
                                               
33
 Žižek, Violence, 179.  
34
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 Slavoj Žižek, Living in the End Times (London: Verso, 2010), 394-95.   
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revolutionary society is put into question.38  But even if we were to accept violence as just 
retribution, divine violence as a sudden burst of retaliatory anger by oppressed people is 
inevitably harming both to the guilty and the innocent. What adds to the problem is that rage 
has historical roots extending beyond the injustice that is inflicted on the presently living.  
Divine violence should remain within the divine realm; for only in this imaginary realm is there 
a being capable of establishing the moral guilt of all.  Still, Žižek’s notion that there are times 
that “the angel of history” interrupts “progress” has merit, but instances of collective rage are 
not such moments. Rather, “time comes to a stop” when collective action reflects human dignity 
and cooperation, anticipates a better society, and seeks to redeem past victims.39 The recent 
nonviolent resistance on Tahrir square, leading to the overthrow of the Mubarak regime in 
Egypt, may be seen as such an “interruption of history.” Žižek hints at this when he describes 
the event as “universal” and “miraculous” due to its unexpected occurrence, “as if the uprising 
was not simply the result of social causes but the intervention of a mysterious agency that we 
can call, in a Platonic way, the eternal idea of freedom, justice, and dignity.”40  
Once the notion of violence is extended, where do you draw the line? Žižek is obviously 
not concerned with this issue, as is clear from his advocacy of what might be called 
revolutionary violence as “shock therapy.”  Violence is now described as the necessary force to 
disrupt entrenched social structures, and the “deeper” the systemic violence the more violence 
is needed to change it. This force may but need not involve subjective violence.  This “shock 
therapy” includes the transformation of the will of the revolutionaries so that they are able to be 
really violent as well as the transformation of the will of the enemies of the revolution, 
“shocking” them to accept the new order.  These aspects of violence as “shock therapy” come 
together in Žižek’s claim that “it is difficult to be really violent, to perform an act that violently 
disturbs the basic parameters of social life.” The difficulty includes that not all people have the 
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“toughness” to shock society into real change.41  Thus Žižek maintains that “Hitler was not 
violent enough”42 (“Hitler did not have ‘the balls’ really to change things”43), that “Gandhi was 
more violent than Hitler: Gandhi's movement effectively endeavored to interrupt the basic 
functioning of the British colonial state,”44 and that Stalin’s forced collectivization was an act 
“for which one truly had to ‘have balls.’”45 Now this word play may seem innocuous enough as 
some kind of assessment of these historical figures’ intentions, aims, and methods, but the 
problem emerges when Žižek connects having the guts to seek real change with having the guts 
to use “shock therapy” as including physical violence as terror.46  Most importantly, he 
describes those leftists in our time who don’t embrace revolution as terror as “sensitive liberals 
[who] want … a decaffeinated revolution, a revolution which doesn't smell of a revolution.”47 
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Or, they want a “softened, ‘decaffeinated’ Fanon and Benjamin.”48 Those who seek real change, 
to the contrary, and, so, are really violent (i.e., they have learned “to love with hatred”49), must 
support violence as terror because only such violence (when the time of revolution arrives) can 
fully negate the present and bring about real new social structures and individuals.  What is 
disconcerting is that violence is now justified without limit and discrimination. It further 
receives a stamp of approval when violence as “shock therapy” is also in some instances called 
“divine violence.”50 In the face of this violence, the violence that Žižek advocates (for now, at 
least?) in the concluding sentence of Violence is preferable: “Sometimes doing nothing is the 
most violent thing to do.”  
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